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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BANKING
THE INCIDENT OF SURVIVORSHIP IN JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
Deposits were made in a savings and loan company from the earn-
ings of a husband and wife who had been married for over 50 years,
the certificate of deposit being made out to John or Ida Fulk. On the
death of the wife the husband was appointed administrator and filed an
inventory of her estate, omitting therefrom the deposit certificates.
Exceptions to the inventory were filed, exceptor contending that one-
half of the account belonged to Ida Fulk's estate. The exceptions were
sustained in the Probate and Common Pleas courts but overruled in
the Court of Appeals, the latter awarding the entire account to John
Fulk. On certification the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate de-
cision, holding that the necessary survivorship clause was supplanted by
parol evidence which was admissible to explain an incomplete contract
of deposit as one for joint ownership with the right of survivorship.'
Where one deposits money in an account payable to himself or
another, the legal effect thereof should be primarily dependent upon the
intention of the depositor.2 Analysis shows that such a deposit is usually
interpreted in one of three ways. (I) The depositor has no intent to
create any property interest in the non-contributing party, the power to
withdraw being given merely for the former's own convenience.3
(2) The depositor intends to pass neither a present property interest nor
a right of withdrawal, but wishes the non-contributing party to receive
the balance of the account when and if he should survive the depositor.4
(3) The depositor wishes to create in the other party a present joint
proprietary interest along with the right of survivorship.
'In Re Estate of Fulk, 136 Ohio St. 233, 24 N.E. (2d) 1020 (1940).
2 7 Am. Jur. Sec. 4.26, p. 301.
'Bender v. Cleveland Trust Co., 123 Ohio St. 588, 176 N.E. 65z (1931)i Held v.
Myers, 48 Ohio App. 131, 19z N.E. 540 (I934). To the effect that the power to with-
draw is revoked by the death of the depositor see Smith v. Planters' Say. Bank, 124 S.C.
1oo, 117 S.E. 352 (2923).
'Schmitt v. Schmitt, 39 Ohio App. 219, 177 N.E. 48 (igS)i Jonte v. English,
171 Okla. 291 , 40 P. (2d) 646 (1935); First Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Huntley, 25 Mich.
483, 232 N.'. 192 (293o). The prevailing view in these cases is that such a deposit is
an ineffective attempt at a testamentary disposition. However, the survivor has been
allowed to take in such a situation on the basis of contract, survival being a condition
precedent. See Rowley, Living Testamentary Dispositions, 3 Cinc. L. Rev. 361, at 388
(x929), discussing Dunn v. Houghton, 51 At. 71 (N. J. Eq., 19oz).
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The present discussion will deal principally with the third interpre-
tation, consideration being given to the various theories which have been
advanced to effectuate such intention, along with an examination of
Ohio cases in point.
Some courts have followed a trust theory to sustain the non-con-
tributing survivor's claim, regarding the depository institution as trus-
tee. This theory hase been severely criticized. A bank deposit in the
general fund creates a debtor-creditor relationship; the bank cannot be
trustee of its own obligation.5 Furthermore it is difficult to find any
intention to create a fiduciary relationship.'
Perhaps the most widely accepted theory is that title has vested in the
non-contributing party by virtue of an inter vivos gift." General rules
of gift require intent to give plus delivery. The requirement of delivery,
while not as rigorous as of old, still demands something more than the
expression of a donative intent.' Retention of the passbook is not con-
clusive evidence against a gift,' although it is a circumstance to be con-
sidered.'" Most cases hold that an intent to make a gift is not shown
merely by a joint deposit, even if a survivorship clause is used."
Recent case authority indicates a growing preference for the con-
tract theory. Where all the funds deposited originally belonged to one
party either a novation or a third party beneficiary contract is spelled
out, based on the deposit itself.'2 Where the deposited funds are the
contributions of both parties the contract is between them and is sup-
ported by mutual consideration. 3
No Ohio cases purport to follow the trust theory; reference to it
was made in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie"4 but the decision was
placed on other grounds. Joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties
are not recognized in Ohio;'" therefore the decisions of this state are to
'Rowley, Living Testamentary Dispositions, 3 Cinc. L. Rev. 361, at 385-6 (2929).
' Note (1924) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 243.
"Deposit in Name of Depositor and Another, 48 A.L.R. i89, at 191, 66 A.L.R. 881,
at 882, 103 A.L.R. 1123, at 1124.
'Bradford v. Eastman, 229 Mass. 499, 118 N.E. 879 (1918)-
'Vollmer v. Vollmer, 47 Ohio App. 154, 190 N.E. 588 (1933); Battles v. Afillhury
Savings Bank, 250 Mass. i8o, 145 N.E. 55 (1924)-
1
oCommercial Trust Co. v. White, 99 N. J. Eq. 2X9, 132 Atl. 761 (1926).
'Grady v. Sheehan, 256 Pa. 377, oo At. 950 (1917); Rice v. Bennington County
Say. Bank, 93 Vt. 493, io8 Atl. 708 (292o); Rauhut v. Reinhart, i8o At. 913 (Del.
1935); Lay v. Proctor, 147 Or. 545, 34 P- (2d) 331 (1934).
' Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, III NE. 317 (19z6)j
Deals, Admr. v. Merchants & Mechanics Savings Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135 (1917)i
Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 478, 286 Pac. 638 (2930).
"In Re Estate of Fulk, 136 Ohio St. 233, 24 N.E. (2d) 1020 (1940); Attorney
General v. Clark, 222 Mass. 291, 22o N.E. 299 (19x5)5 In Re Edwards Estatei, 140 Or.
431, 14 P. (2d) 274 (1932).
i14 Ohio St. 241, at 253, 252 N.E. 373, at 376, 48 A.L.R. 182, at 188 (1926).
Martin, The Incident of Survivorship in Ohio, 3 O.S.L.J. 48 (1937).
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be explained either on a gift or contract basis. The effect of the Ohio
courts' hostility toward the incident of survivorship 6 on the selection
of a theory to support the surviving party's claim is not quite dear.
Clcveland Trust Co. v. Scobie advanced no justification for its recogni-
tion of joint survivorship and hence did not prescribe any one method
by which it can be obtained. But in the later case of In Re Hutchison"
Chief Justice Marshall held that "While joint tenancy with the inci-
dental right of survivorship does not exist in Ohio parties may neverthe-
less contract for a joint ownership with the right of survivorship and
at the death of one of the joint owners the survivor succeeds to the
title to the entire interest, not upon the principle of survivorship as an
incident to the joint tenancy but by the operative provisions of the con-
tract." The funds involved in this case were mutually owned before
deposit; from this fact plus the language of the opinion it has been
asserted that the court restricted recognition of the right of survivorship
to instances where this right has been contracted for between co-owners,
Le., owners of successive estates in the property.'" The narrowing effect
of this interpretation is apparent. But subsequent Ohio decisions have
not so construed the case; it has been cited as requiring merely a con-
tract between the parties (not necessarily co-owners) for the right of
surivorship.'
In the Scobie case Judge Allen said that the depositor "has created
in the second party by contract a joint interest in his right to the deposit
equal to his own."'' The supporting citation of several gift cases, as
well as the demand that the intent to transfer a present interest be
shown, casts some doubt upon the meaning of the court. Was the
decision founded on principles of contract or did the court seize upon
the contract as representing the completion of a valid inter vvos gift?
In Sage v. Flueck,2" a case determined after the Hutchinson limitation,
there is language similar to that found in the Scobie case. However, the
refusal to admit oral testimony to contradict the written expression of
decedent's intention, as found in the deposit contract, points away from
the gift analysis.
It is true that the pure contract approach is nearly identical with the
gift theory which resorts to the contract for purposes of delivery. But
at least one substantial difference does exist. Under the former analy-
" See Note zi, supra.
17 zo Ohio St. 542, x66 N.E. 687 (x929).
"Martin, Thc lncident of Survivorsip in Ohio, 3 O.S.L.J. 48 (1937).
'Sagc v. Flu-k, 13Z Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E. (zd) 8oZ (x937); In Re Estate of Fulk,
1 6 Ohio t. Z33, 24 N.E. (2d) 1920 (1940).
i14 Ohio St. 241, at z53, 151 N.E. 373, at 376, 48 A.L.R. ixz, at M88 (x9z6).
132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E. (zd) 88z (x937).
sis, where the court considers the contract to be fully stated, the appli-
cation of the parol evidence rule might contravene the intention of the
parties.22 This would not be possible under the gift theory; it is founded
upon the intention of the depositor. The trend of the decisions in Mas-
sachusetts is significant in this respect. Language in Chippendale v.
North Adams Sasings Bank"3 negatives the necessity of gift or trust and
upheld the survivor's claim via novation. But later Massachusetts
cases"4 have construed joint deposits from the starting point of the
donor's intention. The analysis is in terms of gift, delivery being ren-
dered unnecessary by the contract of deposit.2".
As for Ohio the Fulk case expresly rules out all question of gift and
proceeds on principles of contract only. Since the funds deposited there
were mutually owned the way is still open for future decisions, dealing
with funds deposited by only one of the parties, to emphasize intent.
The contract theory has been criticized for sometimes overemphasizing
the form of deposit and underemphasizing intent.26 In view of the fact
that the parties are frequently closely related and consequently not
always careful in the wording of the deposit this criticism would seem
sound.
In many states joint deposits are now controlled by statute.2" Ohio
G.C. sec. 9648 was used as the basis for sustaining a survivor's claim
in one Supreme Court case.2 ' This section, as well as 720-12o author-
izes a depository institution to pay funds to the survivor of joint deposi-
tors when the deposit provides for the right of survivorship. It would
seem that these statutes were framed to protect the banks and not to
control the rights of the depositors inter sese. It is significant that sub-
sequent Ohio decisions have ignored the Oleff v. Hodapp rationale.
J. R.Y.
'This would have been the result in Held v. Myers, 48 Ohio App. 131, 19Z N.E.
540 (1934), had not the court construed the Scobie case as one of gift and therefore
admitted evidence showing that the depositor did not intend to pass a property interest
when he opened a "joint and survivorship account."
zzz Mass. 499, as x N.E. 317 (igs6).
Bradford v. Eastman, 229 Mass. 499, xs8 N.E. 879 (1918)i Battles v. Millbury
Savings Bank, z5o Mass. i8o, 145 N.E. 55 (1924)i Goldston v. Randolph, Z93 Mass.
253, gg N.E. 896, 303 A.L.R. X11 7 (1936); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 4 N.E. (zd) 3o9
(Mass., 1936).
" Note (1937) 17 Boston U.L. Rev. 494-
'Note (1939) 27 111. B.J. 343-
"Deposit in Name of Depositor and Another, 303 A.L.R. 1323, 133-40-
' Oleff v. Hodapp, x29 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (193S).
194 LAW JOURNAL-MARCH, 1940
